Editing Mares Young 2016

Introduction 
"Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes" by Isabela Mares and Lauren Young illuminates the complex dynamics of electoral influence across the globe, where voters are often swayed by a mix of threats and promises contingent on their voting behavior. The text emphasizes the evolution of clientelism, detailing the diversity of actors who serve as brokers in the electoral process and the varied forms of clientelism, categorized by positive and negative inducements. The introduction sets the stage for a deeper exploration of the strategic mix between coercive and non-coercive tactics in electoral politics, underlining the critical need for further research into how these strategies impact democratic processes and voter autonomy.

Definitions 
Clientelism is characterized by a transactional relationship between politicians and voters, where voters are given individual incentives to vote in a specific manner, usually mediated through brokers. This relationship is distinct from broader promises of benefits that do not rely on individual voting behavior and from electoral fraud, which directly undermines electoral choice without engaging with voter preferences.
A significant aspect of their definition hinges on the differentiation between positive and negative inducements. Positive inducements include tangible rewards such as money, goods, or favors offered to voters in exchange for their vote—essentially, vote buying. Negative inducements, on the other hand, involve threats of economic or physical harm to coerce voting behavior, including threats to withdraw benefits, eviction, or even acts of violence. The authors underscore the challenges in measuring both types of inducements due to their illicit nature and the mutual interest in concealing the transaction, especially in environments where vote-buying is criminalized.
Another discussion revolves around voter expectations and how they influence the perception and effectiveness of inducements. The distinction between a voter's anticipation of receiving a benefit and their actual receipt of it can alter the nature of the inducement from positive to negative, illustrating the complex dynamics at play in electoral clientelism. This complexity is amplified by the psychological impacts of gains versus losses, suggesting that how voters perceive inducements can significantly affect their electoral decisions.

The Multidimensionality of Clientelism: Variety of Brokers and Strategies
This segment elaborates on the diverse actors involved as brokers in the clientelistic process and their range of strategies, emphasizing the critical role these intermediaries play in mediating between political candidates and voters. The authors underscore the shift in scholarly attention toward understanding the intricacies of these relationships.
The text elaborates on the categories of brokers, which include partisan brokers, state employees, civil society and religious organizations, private actors like employers, ethnic leaders, and even criminal organizations. Each broker type is associated with specific forms of inducements, whether positive, such as monetary gifts or services, or negative, including threats of violence or economic harm. This nuanced view reveals the strategic choices political actors make based on the context, such as institutional settings, voter characteristics, and economic conditions, influencing the mix of clientelistic strategies deployed.

Explaining Mixes in Clientelism: The Role of Institutions and Economic Conditions
The authors argue that the diversity in clientelistic practices can be attributed to the specific political and economic settings within different regions or countries.
The discussion begins by acknowledging the significant role of electoral rules, such as the level of ballot secrecy and the legal ramifications for illicit electoral strategies, in determining the prevalence and type of clientelism. Mares and Young delve into the dynamics of how voter characteristics, including socioeconomic status and psychological factors, influence the likelihood of being targeted by clientelistic strategies. This nuanced analysis suggests that political actors strategically select a mix of clientelistic approaches based on the anticipated effectiveness of these strategies in different institutional and economic contexts.
Furthermore, the text explores the impact of economic conditions on clientelism, highlighting how economic disparities and labor market conditions influence the feasibility and desirability of various clientelistic strategies. The authors point to the interplay between economic factors and institutional settings as critical in shaping the strategic choices of political actors, thereby affecting the overall landscape of clientelism.
Voting Secrecy
This subsection investigates how the degree of ballot secrecy influences the strategies employed in clientelism. This analysis sheds light on the crucial role that the protection of voter secrecy plays in shaping electoral tactics. The authors argue that threats of post-electoral retribution are potent when ballot secrecy is inadequately protected, suggesting a greater reliance on intimidation strategies under such conditions. Conversely, the enforcement of laws safeguarding voting secrecy tends to diminish the utilization of these coercive methods.
Monitoring and Punishment of Malfeasance
This subsection provides an insightful analysis of how variations in monitoring and the severity or likelihood of punishment for electoral misconduct affect the incidence of electoral malfeasance. The authors highlight that, generally, enhanced monitoring tends to reduce electoral malfeasance and that the political experience of European countries post-suffrage expansion presents a compelling case for studying electoral clientelism. This subsection delves into the intriguing cross-national variations in electoral irregularities such as vote buying, intimidation, and ballot stuffing, noting how these practices differed significantly across countries after adopting voter secrecy.
The discussion emphasizes the role of electoral laws and their enforcement in shaping the strategies employed by political actors. For instance, stringent penalties for vote buying in some jurisdictions effectively deterred such practices, pushing political actors toward alternative strategies like intimidation by state employees or unpenalized electoral interventions by employers. This adaptive behavior underscores the strategic calculus political actors use in response to the monitoring and punishment landscape, demonstrating a sophisticated understanding of the risks and rewards associated with various forms of electoral malfeasance.
Electoral Systems and Irregularities
This subsection delves into the complex interplay between electoral systems and the prevalence of electoral irregularities, emphasizing the inconclusive nature of research findings. The discussion highlights that while some studies suggest proportional representation systems might be associated with larger levels of electoral corruption compared to plurality systems, others find no clear relationship between the type of electoral system and electoral malfeasance. This ambiguity in findings underscores the challenges in discerning direct links between electoral systems and the strategies of electoral manipulation employed by political actors.
Further, the authors explore the hypothesis that electoral systems with different candidate selection rules (open or closed lists) might impact levels of electoral corruption differently. However, scholarly consensus needs to be improved, with significant disagreement on whether systems with open or closed lists lead to higher electoral corruption.
Control of Local Institutions: Incumbency and Traditional Leaders
This subsection delves into how the control of local institutions, mainly through incumbency and traditional leadership, significantly influences the distribution and effectiveness of clientelistic strategies. The authors discuss how long-term incumbents, with their extended control over local administrative resources, can leverage these assets to influence electoral outcomes. This control allows for a more strategic deployment of state resources during elections, effectively turning state employees into brokers of clientelism.
The discussion further extends to the role of traditional leaders and local elites, who, like incumbents, can significantly sway electoral results. Deeply rooted in their communities, these leaders command respect and loyalty that can be mobilized for political purposes. Their ability to influence voter behavior, often for economic or ideological reasons, underscores the complex interplay between local governance structures and electoral clientelism.