Editing Blattman Lessing Tobon Duncan 2022 (section)

=== '''''Introduction''''' ===
*Millions of people across the globe live under criminal and state governance, experiencing the establishment of a new social order, community rules in neighborhoods, and other key governance activities while living under a "duoploy of coercion"
*Blattman, Duncan, Tobón, and Lessing, however, explore how criminal and state governance can be complimenting each other, where criminal governance can demand governance from all state actors, while also reducing the dependence on the police institution by satisfying civilian needs
** This would, in turn, make it more difficult for police to arrest gang members and the demise of gang rule could end up backfiring on state governance
*Medellín, Colombia is run by about 350 small gangs or ''combos''. Blattman, Duncan, and Lessing conducting a survey of about 7,000 residents where they found the state to be the predominant provider of governance, while smaller communities continued to be provided governance mostly through ''combos''. The ''combos'' collected taxes from the community and emphasized, however, how their collection of taxes was not meant for direct profit, but rather a blanket of protection for their drug sales and business sales from the police.
*Blattman, Duncan, Tobón,and Lessing provide a diagram outlining the increase in distance from policing and ''columnas'' and how this led to lower gang rule and a an increase in violent crime due to the lowered responsiveness of state actors, impacting the legitimacy of state governance amongst civilians.
*Gang rule appears and manifests differently in countries like El Salvador, eastern Congo, and Mexico--gang rule is not objective.