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| Charles Tilly contends that the coercive and self-serving behaviors inherent in war making and state making, coupled with their reliance on violence and exploitation, closely resemble the traits associated with organized crime. This perspective challenges the traditional perception of these activities as legitimate forms of governance, highlighting their parallels with illicit practices typically associated with criminal enterprises. | | Charles Tilly contends that the coercive and self-serving behaviors inherent in war making and state making, coupled with their reliance on violence and exploitation, closely resemble the traits associated with organized crime. This perspective challenges the traditional perception of these activities as legitimate forms of governance, highlighting their parallels with illicit practices typically associated with criminal enterprises. |
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| ===Warning=== | | ====Warning==== |
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| '''''Introduction'''''
| | '''Introduction''' |
| *Building upon Weberian definition of the state
| | Building upon Weberian definition of the state |
| : I.e. The state as an organization that holds the monopoly of legitimate violence over a given geographic territory
| | The state as an organization that holds the monopoly of legitimate violence over a given geographic territory |
| *Analogizes the '''creation of modern nation-states''' with '''organized crime''' in the form of a '''protection racket''' that operates with the authority of '''legitimacy'''.
| | Analogizes the creation of modern nation-states with organized crime in the form of a protection racket that operates with the authority of legitimacy. |
| **Those responsible for war-making and state-making are compared to manipulative entrepreneurs who use coercive violence for self-seeking purposes
| | Those responsible for war-making and state-making are compared to manipulative entrepreneurs who use coercive violence for self-seeking purposes |
| *As opposed to:
| | As opposed to: |
| :: States as a social contract under which the authorities of states and military offer services to the population through an open market
| | States as a social contract under which the authorities of states and military offer services to the population through an open market |
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| '''''Purpose'''''
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| *Attempting to address contemporary concerns regarding the looming presence of military organization and action throughout the world including:
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| **The increasing destructiveness of war
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| **The expanding role of great powers suppliers of arms and military organization to poor countries
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| **The growing importance of military rule in those same countries
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| ---- | | ---- |
| '''''The Nation-State''''' | | '''Purpose''' |
| *Characteristics of the modern nation-state
| | Attempting to address contemporary concerns such as the following: |
| **Rule over a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory
| | Increasing destructiveness of war |
| **Relatively centralized
| | Expanding role of great powers suppliers of arms and military organization to poor countries |
| **Contains differentiated organizations
| | Looming presence of military organization and action throughout the world |
| **Officials successfully monopolize the means of violence
| | Growing importance of military rule in those same countries |
| *Primary example utilized: creation of sixteenth/seventeenth century Western European national states
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| **E.g. Specifically France’s growth from 1600 onward
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| ---- | | ---- |
| '''''Theoretical Framework''''' | | '''The Nation-State''' |
| *Comparing premodern western Europe’s formation of nation-states and the present day third world
| | Characteristics of the modern nation-state |
| **Using the example of European experience to better understand and address modern issues
| | Rule over a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory |
| *Caveat
| | Relatively centralized |
| **Third-world countries and premodern Europe do not strongly resemble one another
| | Contains differentiated organizations |
| **Europe’s past cannot predict the future of third-world countries
| | Officials successfully monopolize the means of violence |
| *Still, we can apply analyses of Europe in comparison to the third world specifically in terms of:
| | Primary example utilized: creation of sixteenth/seventeenth century Western European national states |
| **Theoretical framework: <br>
| | E.g. Specifically France’s growth from 1600 onward |
| :: '''Coercive exploitation by state/war-makers → popular resistance → implementation of protection and constraints on the state’s own violence by the state itself'''
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| ---- | | ---- |
| '''''Subject of the essay''''' | | '''Theoretical Framework''' |
| *Organized means of violence → growth and change in forms of government → modern nation-state
| | Comparing premodern western Europe’s formation of nation-states and the present day third world |
| **I.e. '''Interdependent processes: War-making ↔ state-making'''
| | Using the example of European experience to better understand and address modern issues |
| ***Also, during the initial conception and rise of nation-states in Western countries: <br>
| | Caveat |
| ::: State-making ↔ mercantile capitalism | | Third-world countries and premodern Europe do not strongly resemble one another |
| *'''Argument: War makes states'''
| | Europe’s past cannot predict the future of third-world countries |
| **Analogy between '''state-making and war-making''' and '''organized crime''' (i.e. protection rackets)
| | Still, we can apply analyses of Europe in comparison to the third world specifically in terms of: |
| ***Difference: States operate with the advantage of '''legitimacy'''
| | Theoretical framework: |
| ***Organized crime: less successful and smaller-scale version of war-making and state-making processes
| | Coercive exploitation by state/war-makers → popular resistance → implementation of protection and constraints on the state’s own violence by the state itself |
| ***All on the same continuum: Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing, war-making
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| ---- | | ---- |
| ===Double-Edged Protection===
| | '''Subject of the essay''' |
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| | Organized means of violence → growth and change in forms of government → modern nation-state |
| '''Summary''' | | I.e. Interdependence: War-making ↔ state-making |
| *In this section, Tilly discusses the contrasting perceptions of the term "protection." He highlights two distinct connotations associated with protection: one being comforting and the other ominous. Upon defining these connotations, Tilly discusses the various nuances encompassing perception. The passage can be broken down into the following categories:
| | Also, during the initial conception and rise of nation-states in Western countries: |
| ---- | | State-making ↔ mercantile capitalism |
| '''Comforting vs. Ominous Tone''': Tilly distinguishes between the comforting aspect of protection, symbolizing safety and security provided by a powerful entity, and the ominous tone, representing coercive practices where individuals are forced to pay tribute to avoid harm.
| | Argument: War makes states |
| | | Analogy between state-making and war-making and organized crime (i.e. protection rackets) |
| '''Degree of Coercion''': The difference between the two perceptions lies in the degree of coercion involved. While some forms of protection are based on mutual benefit and trust, others involve explicit threats and extortion to extract payments.
| | Difference: States operate with the advantage of legitimacy |
| | | Organized crime: less successful and smaller scale version of war-making and state-making processes |
| '''Dependence on Threat Perception''': The interpretation of "protection" is heavily influenced by the perceived reality and external nature of the threat. Individuals may comply with demands for protection based on their assessment of the risks involved.
| | All on the same continuum: Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing, war-making |
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| '''Power Dynamics''': Tilly highlights the power dynamics at play in situations of protection, where individuals may feel compelled to pay for security even if it involves coercion, reflecting a complex interplay between security and exploitation.
| | ====Double-Edged Protection==== |
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| ===Violence and Government=== | | ===Violence and Government=== |