Blattman Lessing Tobon Duncan 2022: Difference between revisions
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=== '''Main Argument:''' === | === '''Main Argument:''' === | ||
Christopher Blattman, Gustavo Duncan, and Benjamin Lessing explore how the state governance and gang rule co-exist and possibly compliment each other, despite the differing tactics of eliciting power, through examples of gang presence in several countries, noting how gangs tend to drive out the state and serve civilians. Throughout this essay, they interview gang members, perform case studies in Medellín, | Christopher Blattman, Gustavo Duncan, and Benjamin Lessing explore how the state governance and gang rule co-exist and possibly compliment each other, despite the differing tactics of eliciting power, through examples of gang presence in several countries, noting how gangs tend to drive out the state and serve civilians. Throughout this essay, they interview gang members, perform case studies in Medellín, Colombia, and analyze the emergence, growth, and establishment of gang rule while acknowledging the state's presence and impact on gang rule. | ||
=== '''''Introduction''''' === | === '''''Introduction''''' === | ||
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*Blattman, Duncan, and Lessing, however, explore how criminal and state governance can be complimenting each other, where criminal governance can demand governance from all state actors, while also reducing the dependence on the police institution by satisfying civilian needs | *Blattman, Duncan, and Lessing, however, explore how criminal and state governance can be complimenting each other, where criminal governance can demand governance from all state actors, while also reducing the dependence on the police institution by satisfying civilian needs | ||
** This would, in turn, make it more difficult for police to arrest gang members and the demise of gang rule could end up backfiring on state governance | ** This would, in turn, make it more difficult for police to arrest gang members and the demise of gang rule could end up backfiring on state governance | ||
*Medellín, Colombia is run by about 350 small gangs or ''combos''. Blattman, Duncan, and Lessing conducting a survey of about 7,000 residents where they found the state to be the predominant provider of governance, while smaller communities continued to be provided governance mostly through ''combos''. The ''combos'' collected taxes from the community and emphasized, however, how their collection of taxes was not meant for direct profit, but rather a blanket of protection for their drug sales and business sales from the police. | |||
*Blattman, Duncan, and Lessing provide a diagram outlining the increase in distance from policing and ''columnas'' and how this led to lower gang rule and a an increase in violent crime due to the lowered responsiveness of state actors, impacting the legitimacy of state governance amongst civilians. | |||
*Gang rule appears and enancts different in countries like El Salvador, eastern Congo, and Mexico--gang rule is not objective. | |||
Revision as of 08:01, 27 February 2024
Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance
Main Argument:
Christopher Blattman, Gustavo Duncan, and Benjamin Lessing explore how the state governance and gang rule co-exist and possibly compliment each other, despite the differing tactics of eliciting power, through examples of gang presence in several countries, noting how gangs tend to drive out the state and serve civilians. Throughout this essay, they interview gang members, perform case studies in Medellín, Colombia, and analyze the emergence, growth, and establishment of gang rule while acknowledging the state's presence and impact on gang rule.
Introduction
- Millions of people across the globe live under criminal and state governance, experiencing the establishment of a new social order, community rules in neighborhoods, and other key governance activities while living under a "duoploy of coercion"
- Blattman, Duncan, and Lessing, however, explore how criminal and state governance can be complimenting each other, where criminal governance can demand governance from all state actors, while also reducing the dependence on the police institution by satisfying civilian needs
- This would, in turn, make it more difficult for police to arrest gang members and the demise of gang rule could end up backfiring on state governance
- Medellín, Colombia is run by about 350 small gangs or combos. Blattman, Duncan, and Lessing conducting a survey of about 7,000 residents where they found the state to be the predominant provider of governance, while smaller communities continued to be provided governance mostly through combos. The combos collected taxes from the community and emphasized, however, how their collection of taxes was not meant for direct profit, but rather a blanket of protection for their drug sales and business sales from the police.
- Blattman, Duncan, and Lessing provide a diagram outlining the increase in distance from policing and columnas and how this led to lower gang rule and a an increase in violent crime due to the lowered responsiveness of state actors, impacting the legitimacy of state governance amongst civilians.
- Gang rule appears and enancts different in countries like El Salvador, eastern Congo, and Mexico--gang rule is not objective.
(small heading)
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