Blattman Lessing Tobon Duncan 2022: Difference between revisions

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=== '''''Descriptive Analysis'''''===
=== '''''Descriptive Analysis'''''===
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*''The State'': Medellín has 2.6 million people,269 nieghborhoods or ''barrios'', and about 2500 civilian staff from The Secretariat to provide on-call response to violence and emergencies. The Metropolitan Polcie is separate from the governemnt and has about 280 officers per 100,000 people.
*''Combo Organizations and Operations'':380 ''combos'', 354 of which are in Medellín, and Blattman, Duncan, Tobón,and Lessing have the most detailed information on 12 ''combos''. ''Combo'' revenue comes from retail drug sales in ''plazas de vicio'', a business security fee for protection services, local loan-sharking known as ''gota a gota'', and collect debts for a fee while managing local consumer markets. Most combos are small and have autonomy, led by a ''coordinador'; with a long-term relational contract with ''razones'' who supply wholesale drugs for the ''combo'''s retail operations
 





Revision as of 08:36, 27 February 2024

Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance

Main Argument:

Christopher Blattman, Gustavo Duncan, Santiago Tobón and Benjamin Lessing explore how the state governance and gang rule co-exist and possibly compliment each other, despite the differing tactics of eliciting power, through examples of gang presence in several countries, noting how gangs tend to drive out the state and serve civilians. Throughout this essay, they interview gang members, perform case studies in Medellín, Colombia, and analyze the emergence, growth, and establishment of gang rule while acknowledging the state's presence and impact on gang rule.

Introduction

  • Millions of people across the globe live under criminal and state governance, experiencing the establishment of a new social order, community rules in neighborhoods, and other key governance activities while living under a "duoploy of coercion"
  • Blattman, Duncan, Tobón, and Lessing, however, explore how criminal and state governance can be complimenting each other, where criminal governance can demand governance from all state actors, while also reducing the dependence on the police institution by satisfying civilian needs
    • This would, in turn, make it more difficult for police to arrest gang members and the demise of gang rule could end up backfiring on state governance
  • Medellín, Colombia is run by about 350 small gangs or combos. Blattman, Duncan, and Lessing conducting a survey of about 7,000 residents where they found the state to be the predominant provider of governance, while smaller communities continued to be provided governance mostly through combos. The combos collected taxes from the community and emphasized, however, how their collection of taxes was not meant for direct profit, but rather a blanket of protection for their drug sales and business sales from the police.
  • Blattman, Duncan, Tobón,and Lessing provide a diagram outlining the increase in distance from policing and columnas and how this led to lower gang rule and a an increase in violent crime due to the lowered responsiveness of state actors, impacting the legitimacy of state governance amongst civilians.
  • Gang rule appears and manifests differently in countries like El Salvador, eastern Congo, and Mexico--gang rule is not objective.

Data and Methods

Qualitative Interviews

  • Blattman, Duncan, Tobón,and Lessing conducted 118 interviews with criminal leaders and members across 41 groups, including 28 combos and 13 high-level, mafia-like organizations called razones.
  • Most interviews were conducted in public areas and prisons and the sample is from leaders and members who were willing to speak. Some even led them to additional sources.
  • Blattman, Duncan, Tobón,and Lessing also interviewed local crime experts, the Attorney General's office and members of the Metropolitan Police.
  • Blattman, Duncan, Tobón,and Lessing also conducted 153 interviews with community leaders and members in 108 neighborhoods. They also return post-pandemic to follow-up with community and criminal leaders to see how the pandemic impacted gang governance.
  • Data quality: Blattman, Duncan, Tobón,and Lessing believed the gang leaders were truthful as gang organization and rule is a non-sensitive subject and not a prosecutable offense. Many gang members were flattered by the interviews and believed academia would fortify the power of gangs and their power reputation to the state. Blattman, Duncan, Tobón,and Lessing also validated their observations with multiple sources--although the qualitative data cannot be trusted entirely.
  • Qualitative Methods:Blattman, Duncan, Tobón,and Lessing collaborated with two economists, two ethnographers, a local organized-crime journalist, and a government gang outreach worker in order to conduct interviews, transcribe, and upload them to a private encrypted wiki to preserve its continuous collaborative format.
  • Ethics and Human Subjects Protections: Blattman, Duncan, Tobón,and Lessing emphasized the intentions of their research while also attempting to maintain anonymity and confidentiality. They also made it clear to only take voluntary interviews, where gang members and community members did not feel forced to speak.

Survey Data and Measurement Strategies

  • Blattman, Duncan, Tobón,and Lessing conducted over 7,000 private community surveys while acknowledging the possible misreporting of gang activity and address the concern of under-reporting, which they did not encounter.

Descriptive Analysis

  • The State: Medellín has 2.6 million people,269 nieghborhoods or barrios, and about 2500 civilian staff from The Secretariat to provide on-call response to violence and emergencies. The Metropolitan Polcie is separate from the governemnt and has about 280 officers per 100,000 people.
  • Combo Organizations and Operations:380 combos, 354 of which are in Medellín, and Blattman, Duncan, Tobón,and Lessing have the most detailed information on 12 combos. Combo revenue comes from retail drug sales in plazas de vicio, a business security fee for protection services, local loan-sharking known as gota a gota, and collect debts for a fee while managing local consumer markets. Most combos are small and have autonomy, led by a coordinador'; with a long-term relational contract with razones who supply wholesale drugs for the combos retail operations





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