Stephan Chenoweth 2008

Reading: Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict”, International Security, 33.1, pp. 7–44.

• Main Argument: Nonviolent resistance can pose effective challenges to democratic and nondemocratic opponents, and at times can do so more effectively than violent resistance.

Intro

• Typical Assumption: violent resistance more successful than nonviolent
• Data shows (1990-2006) : 53% success for major nonviolent campaigns, 26% for violent campaigns
  • Why?
    • nonviolence = more internal + external legitimacy; easier to support
    • Violent crackdowns by gout on nonviolent resistance more likely to backfire, seen as less extreme groups, less deserving of harsh treatment
• Argument: nonviolent resistance is potentially more effective than violent resistance at challenging regimes of various types

What Works (sec. 1)

• Nonviolent resistance is waging Conflict thru social psychological, economic, and political means without threat or use of violence
  • Outside traditional political channels
  • Strategic vs. principled
    • Principled has religious or ethical basis, strategic is calculated for results
  • Widespread cooperation + defiance » control of conflict
• Violent Resistance - coercion via physical threat
  • Seen as more effective (though terrorists lack success)
• Argument
  • Repressing nonviolence backfires
    • More support for campaign, more dissent towards regime —> harder to deny their demands
    • Higher cost to fighting nonviolence with force - force is ok for violent resisters
    • Nonviolence can gain more defectors from regime supporters
    • International condemnation
  • Nonviolence - more open to negotiation
    • Both campaigners + regime will be more amenable to negotiation compromise
    • Public Sees nonviolent campaigns as more amenable, less dangerous
    • Public + regime less likely to support groups that threaten their safety

Testing the Theory (Sec: 2)

• Hypothesis 1: Willingness of regime to use evidence will advantage nonviolent groups, hurt ident groups
• Hypothesis 2: Nonviolent resistance has advantage over ident in producing defectors dom security forces
• Hypothesis 3: International sanctions and overt state support for the campaign will advantage nonviolent campaigns over violent
• Hypothesis 4: External state support for target regime will disadvantage violent and nonviolent campaigns
• Methodology
  • Goals:
    • which campaigns are more successful
    • which variables shape outcomes
    • whether structural factors shape success
  • Data: 323 campaigns from 1900 -2006
    • Campaigns can be entirely or primarily nonviolent, or violent
      • violence + non violence often occurs together
    • Year of campaign's "peak" paralyzed (max # of members or end of campaign)
• Results
  • H1
    • With regime crackdowns, nonviolent resistance is 6 times more likely to achieve full success than violent; but neither campaigns benefit from repression, which has no effect on outcome
    • Repressive regimes 12 times likelier to give limited concessions to NU campaigns
  • H2
    • Defections increase chances of campaign success by 4+ times
    • But nonviolent methods have insignificant impact on security force defections
    • Defections more common in successful NV campaigns than successful violin t campaign
    • NV campaigns with defections are 46 times more successful than violent campaigns without them
  • H3
    • External support increases success 3 times against repressive regimes
    • International sanctions have no effect on campaign outcomes
    • outside support has no effect on NV campaigns, makes V campaigns 3 times more successful
    • Sanctions have no effect on NV, make V campaigns 2 times more successful
  • H4
    • State support of target regime is insignificant; does not disadvantage V or NV campaigns
  • Other Results
    • Target polity positively affects campaigns - democracies are more receptive to resistance, especially NV
    • Duration has no impact on full success, slightly increases partial success.
    • Post - Cold war campaigns more successful than pre
  • Explaining Results
    • Foreign support does not benefit NV campaigns, sanctions don’t either
      • Over-reliance on outside resources, lack of local support base
      • Delegitimize group (foreign-dominated perception)
      • Sanctions may actually limit NV campaign resources.
    • Foreign support benefits violent campaigns, sanctions help too
      • sanctions do less to stop forcible extraction of resources by violent campaigns
      • less dependent on broad citizen participation

• Case Studies
  • East Timor (1988-99)
    • Summary
      • Indonesian President Suharto ordered an invasion of the newly decolonized East Timor, claiming that it could pose a communist threat to the region. Despite UN condemnation, international action resulted in little to no enforcement.
      • Early resistance consisted of traditional and guerrilla warfare led by East Timorese groups, however, Indonesian counterinsurgency led to a strategic shift. The new nonpartisan resistance front, CNRM, was designed to be as inclusive as possible and included a diplomatic front and clandestine front in addition to its armed forces. The CNRM was able to construct a large, decentralized network of activists that staged educational campaigns and nonviolent protests to raise awareness and gain support. These protests were designed to bring international attention, timed with the visits of foreign officials.
      • The major turning point was a massacre carried out at a nonviolent funeral procession that resulted in the death of more than 200 people. The act was broadcast internationally and brought global attention to the issue.
      • After the fall of Suharto's reign, international pressure was put on the new leader, Habibie, to grant independence to East Timor. After a referendum in which 80% of East Timorese voted for independence, Indonesian militias launched actions that led to mass destruction and displacement. East Timorese armed forces did not react with violence, stating that they did not want to be drawn into the creation of a civil war. East Timor was recognized as an independent state in 2002.
    • International Factors
      • "Indonesianization" and "Internationalization"
        • East Timorese activists engaged with Indonesian intellectuals and human rights activists in order to shift loyalties against the regime. International institutions and foreign governments that supported the Suharto regime were targeted with nonviolent tactics, such as. sit-ins.
    • Domestic Factors
      • The initial violent campaign failed to shift loyalty among Indonesians, instead creating animosity among security forces. While the Indonesian counterinsurgency tactics garnered support among the guerilla forces, their numbers remained small and only served to escalate the violent conflict.
      • The nonviolent campaign produced loyalty shifts, in part through the mass mobilization of Indonesian students. Divisions in the Indonesian military, in addition to the intentional generous treatment of captured Indonesian soldiers, garnered a lack of faith in Suharto's regime.
  • The Philippines (1986)
    • Summary
      • Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972 and silenced the opposition by accusing them of allying with communists, seizing assets, and imprisoning many. Opposition parties included the CPP and the NPA, the latter of which used guerilla tactics to enforce opposition. After opposition leader, Senator Aquino Jr. lost in the parliamentary elections of 1978, some opposition members engaged in violent actions, resulting in the US government blacklisting the Filipino opposition as terrorists.
      • The assassination of Senator Aquino, who returned from exile hoping to negotiate a peaceful transfer of power, drew international outrage and attention, as well as domestic unrest. Marcos called for snap elections hoping to quell this unrest, and the opposition, now united under UNIDO, called for nonviolence amongst their supporters. Marcos' false claims of victory inspired 2 million Filipinos to rally and proclaim a victory of the people.
      • Filipinos organized and participated in general strikes, boycotts, and nonviolent protests. These actions were internationally broadcast, and the world was able to witness nonviolent resistance in the face of Marcos'military action. The United States pulled its support of the Marcos regime and instead showed support for the opposition movement. A parallel government was formed, and Marcos was transported out of the Philippines.
    • International Factors
      • No international entities formally sanctioned the actions of Marcos. However, after Aquino's assassination, the United States was compelled to pressure Marcos for reforms and eventually assist in his removal from power. Once the United States refused to continue the military and economic aid sustaining his regime, Marcos was forced to concede.
    • Domestic Factors
      • Initial guerilla warfare was unsuccessful in securing loyalty shifts, particularly among security forces.
      • Nonviolent civil disobedience was more effective in fomenting support against the regime, and a protest between military defectors and civilians against Marcos brought international attention. The popular defection among security forces left the military unreliable, weakening Marcos to the point of defeat.
  • Burma (1988-90)
    • Summary
      • General Ne Win came to power as the result of a 1962 military coup, causing the military to dominate Burmese politics and its economy. In 1988, a Burmese student was killed by riot police, and mass demonstrations ensued. These protests were met with violent force, with hundreds of students being killed and more imprisoned. General Ne Win announced he would step down, and the man responsible for the aforementioned massacre was installed as head of the party chairman for the BSPP, the ruling political party. Ensuing protests were again met with stark military retaliation, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,000 demonstrators over a three-day period.
      • After the 1990 elections were held, with the opposition party garnering the mass majority of the vote, the regime refused to honor the results. Instead, opposition leaders were placed on house arrest and activists were killed. Violent resistance proved futile, and guerilla groups were overtaken by the Burmese military. Nonviolent actions were unsuccessful, as the opposition was demobilized and unable to form a strong position against the regime, and it remains in power.
    • International Factors
      • Efforts to regain democracy garnered international attention, yet little international action. The United States imposed sanctions against Burma, but as the regime was easily able to find substitutions elsewhere, the sanctions proved to be ineffective and weak.
    • Domestic Factors
      • Opposition groups were unable to create loyalty shifts within security forces and were unsuccessful in creating a meaningful alternative to the current regime. Additionally, mobilization struggled due to the reliance on single individuals, and a disorganized message that failed to relay information about human rights abuse.
      • Though the opposition was able to organize after the relaxation of martial law following the 1988 massacre, infighting slowed progress. The lack of a unified movement allowed for the Burmese government to launch another coup, continuing the oppressive regime.
  • Case Study Summary: Explaining Success and Failure
    • Violent campaigns were largely unsuccessful in shifting loyalty and increasing the political costs of repressing opposition. Violence also fails to attract international action, which can apply pressure on regimes.
    • Regardless of the use of violence or nonviolence, campaigns that are unable to create loyalty shifts within the security forces or bureaucracy are likely to fail. However, nonviolent campaigns are more likely to secure these necessary shifts. Nonviolent campaigns are also more likely to succeed in response to brutal retaliation than violent campaigns, as they are more likely to produce international and domestic backfire.
    • Mass mobilization is more common in nonviolent campaigns. Mobilization that is decentralized, and broad-based occurred in the cases of campaign success and maybe the critical determinant of success based on the case studies. Regime repression against the opposition can aid in producing mass mobilization.